Philosophy Communication Barriers Essay

(a) How does mob think of my intending to say something? Does he think of it as a touch in consciousness? crowd argues that our phrasing intended to say is an close wrong explanation on a subconscious or hitherto psychic thing that it happening within our perspicacitys. The plosive is that we never consciously form the course in our studyings or withal draw upon our computer storage banks to c every last(predicate) to musical theme images of the thing that we mean to say. Instead, it is an unconscious function of the mind that we hear something and choose to respond to it with some form of actors line. In the accompaniment that the language we choose is wrong, we often react with the phrase.What I meant to say was pack argues that this happens when the precognition of our own mind fails to work rapidly enough to bide the reaction of the person we be speaking to and choose the proper lyric to convey to a thought stream to that unique(predicate) person. On the almo st basic level, it means that our minds did not act quickly enough to reticence the proper word into a sentence.For example, imagine talking to your best adept ab let on her sister. The intended sentence would be, Hows she doing? As the speaker you would not have planned out the conversation or thought peculiar(prenominal)ally about what to ask, unless when you speak and say, Hows he doing? the immediate reaction is to say, I meant she. Hows she doing? there is never a point at which the conscious mind stops and chooses the words to expend.This might therefore bring about an interesting hold forthion for linguists and psychologists to determine how spoken communication actually happens. James argues that it is a subconscious thing, which implies then that speech is a learned ability you stern train the subconscious mind. Take for example learning to speak some other language fluently. Teachers argue that you stoolnot speak another language fluently until you can think in that language.The premise is basically the kindred as what James has argues. If you are totally fluent in the language and somevirtuoso asks, Que es el nombre del gato? You will be responding with the cats name onwards the image of the cat is even called to mind. If you are less than fluent, you will need to translate the question before you can answer, hence moving the rejoinder from the subconscious speech centers to the conscious mind.(b) Can the arguments Wittgenstein employs against the opinion that perceiveing words is a conscious change be adapted to arrangement that intending or moment to say words is not a conscious process that begins before I say them Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is delineate as we expend it, not by some memory blink card system begun when we are children. This then would explain in position the tendency to crease euphemisms and phrases which cannot be translated literally based on the presumed meaning of the individual world. To use his argument, if language were a conscious thing, human speech patterns would invariably be precise and would never relay on simile, fiction or any other form of literary device. Instead, in essence, he is present that because language to create imagery that is not a specific reflection of the claim meaning of what is said, it is a subconscious action.Likewise then, if the use of language is subconscious and not dependent on a specific meaning when a word is chosen, Wittgensteins argument can well be developed to explain that the use of words or even the development of an answer is not necessarily a conscious thing. cogitate of it as a sort of language autopilot. Our subconscious mind understands what is organism discussed and how to respond to it before the conscious mind has a chance to understand the nature of the question. Therefore, the subconscious mind can break a response and begin it before the conscious mind starts to speak. In the event that the consci ous mind disrupts the process and inserts its own words, the subconscious mind can saddle it a message that says, What I meant to say was.c) James claims that intending to say something is or provides an anticipation or premonition (=knowledge in advance) of the words I will say or think. Do Wittgensteins remarks in section. 187-192 show that James is laboring under some misunderstanding about this? Explain.Wittgensteins remarks augur that James is misunderstanding the functioning of the mind by job the natural process of communication between the conscious and subconscious premonition. He would argue that the act of speech is a sort of subconscious act, with plainly specific forms of speech coming from the conscious mind. If both parts of the mind are working in proper harmony, the subconscious can formulate and plan a response long before the conscious mind can even think about it.However, this is not a self-premonition or anything as supernatural as James might be implying. I nstead, it is a factor of the understanding of the human brain and how it full treatment. Since the body cannot, by definition, understand the workings of the subconscious, we only when must accept that these incidences occur when the subconscious works more rapidly than the conscious mind. Wittgenstein argues that this is not a premonition, but barely evidence that the mind works much faster than we appreciate.2.) P. F. Strawson writesStates or experiencesowe their individuation as particulars to the identity of the person whose states and experiences they are. From this it follows immediately that if they can be identified as particular states and experiences at all, they must be havein such a way that it is logically impossible that a particular state or experience in fact feature by someone should have been possessed by anyone else. The requirements of identity see out logical transferability of ownership. Individuals, p. 97(a) Briefly describe Wittgensteins treatment of the idea that another person cant have my wounds in Philosophical Investigations Section 253. (Describe the aims and strategy of his remarks.)Wittgenstein disagrees with Strawson, with a tongue-in-cheek sarcasm to instance that in the event of Siamese twins, two people could share the take on aforesaid(prenominal) pain. Ultimately, though his goal is to demonstrate that identity is not as important to the identification of pain as far as hole and intensity. Whether a person has the ask same cephalalgia that you are having is not nearly as relevant as the fact that they have had a cephalalgia in the past and can therefore commiserate with the pain that you are feeling. In essence, he is arguing that the sameness of the pain is also irrelevant.When discussing the human condition, it is more important to draw parallels between like hazard than to throw up semi-rational boundaries such as the identifiers that Strawson used. While it may technically, maybe, be impossible for m ore than one other person to feel the exact same pain that you are feeling, in the human nature of free speech we often use the phrase same pain to indicate that we have been in similar circumstances.Drawing unnecessary barriers by pointing out that our individuality will affect the way that we feel pain does zip fastener to promote a greater understanding of pain, the nature of the individual, the nature of empathy or the human condition. If Strawson were attempting to define the uniqueness of the individual, his commentary might have been relevant, but in a discussion about the nature of pain, it is divisive and irrelevant. The point is to discuss the sameness of the human condition in that while we may have different understandings of pain, we can interrelate via the concept of pain. For example, two women with catamenial cramps may not be experiencing the same intensity of pain or even the same location, but they can relate based on the similar circumstance.(b) Do observations like those in his PhilosophicalRemarks *2 account for all the ways we use the expression (same) pain?Wittgensteins examples via Philosophical Remarks by chance do not go far enough in disavowing Strawsons claims, but he does make a good start. By arguing that the criteria of identifying the sameness of pain involves location and intensity as criteria rather than identity of the person feeling the pain, Wittgenstein effectively argues that Strawsons claim is false. What he fails to discuss are the non-physical sources of pain and whether they can be the same pain or if Strawson is closer to the mark when using inaccurate language to describe excited trauma.But here too, if Wittgenstein had desired, he could argue that Strawsons claim is basically flawed. Again, we go first to the example of identical twins that are embossed together. Though there might be some divergencys in their frantic makeup, for the most part, they are going to feel emotional pain in the same way. But eve n if we forgo the genetic aspect ad entirely discuss emotion as an end result of experience, it seems humourous to assume that each of the six billion people on the artificial satellite will have experienced life in a completely unique way and will therefore never have the same pain as another person.(c) Push Wittgensteins investigation one step further. We say things like this I had two bad headaches at present one in the morning and one in the afternoon. What are criteria for sameness and difference in such cases?The chief(a) criteria for sameness and difference in this case would be the location of the headache and its intensity. For example, a tautness headache might begin at the base of the spine and broaden upward, a sinus headache might begin just below the eyes and a migraine might be a throb in the temples. Each can be described as a bad headache depending on the severity and each is unique in its location. However, often people who are prone to headaches will have them in the same location and are given to saying, I had that same headache again to indicate to the listeners that this is a recurring problem in the same location with the same intensity.When language is used precisely, this is an inexact statement, but if the primary purpose of language is to convey meaning to the listener, this can be a much simpler way of saying I have a headache again in the same spot as I did yesterday and it hurts the same amount. Much like with the other discussion, Wittgenstein seems to be challenging his brother philosophers regarding their choice and use of the language. Because the language itself is inexact, making a claim simply based on the language usage is invalid.(d) Do these cases vindicate Strawson?I do not believe these issues vindicate Strawson at all. It appears that he was doing exact what Wittgenstein was trying to warn against he was using an imprecise example of language to erect a barrier to human empathy that need not exist. more oft en than not speaking, when a person uses the phrases, I feel your pain it is to indicate that I have been in a similar circumstance and have matte up pain because of it. As such, I can empathize with your pain. However, people simply do not talk that way and to expect them to do so is illogical.Therefore, Wittgenstein rebukes Strawson, fairly gently, trying to make him understand that the same is not always the same. It makes perfect sense when you consider the propensity in English to use the phrase exactly the same. Though sameness implies that two things are alike, we have learned to differentiate between things that are similar and thus the same in casual conversation and things that are identical.